Introduction
The aim of this paper is to argue that update semantics is a natural framework for contextually restricted quanti cation, and to illustrate its use in the analysis of anaphoric de nite descriptions and certain other anaphoric terms.
The present discussion remains at an informal level, but takes place against the background of the system of update semantics for the language of modal predicate logic as presented in Groenendijk et al. 1995a; Groenendijk et al. 1995c . The theoretical notions that are used rather casually in the present paper are intended to be in accordance with the formal ones de ned in those earlier papers. As for the additions to the system particular to the paper at hand, their formal rendering has to be deferred to another occasion.
On the descriptive level, the paper focusses on (singular) anaphoric definite descriptions. The suggestion made here, is to treat them|together with certain other anaphoric terms|as quanti ers, where quanti cation is dynamic and contextually restricted.
We share the philosophy of Neale 1993 and Ludlow and Neale 1991 , who defend a uniform Russellian, i.e., a quanti cational analysis of the semantics of de nites and inde nites, explaining apparent non-quanti cational aspects in (epistemic) pragmatic terms. Our contribution to this stock of ideas, is to look upon quanti cation as being of a dynamic nature|in order to account for binding relations across the syntactic scope of quanti ers|, and, when suitable, restricted to context sets|in order to make sense of the uniqueness preconditions of anaphoric de nite descriptions, and the preconditions of other kinds of anaphoric terms. 1 The point of view that (anaphoric) de nite descriptions involve context dependent quanti cation is not new, of course. We hope to show, though, that 1. The term`anaphoric' is used here in a liberal way. It is not narrowly restricted to cases where an expression can be linked via coindexing with a preceding phrase. It applies to all cases where an expression is used in such a way that its interpretation depends on one or more foregoing phrases. update semantics allows a natural explication of the way in which the contextually determined domains of quanti cation come about, an aspect which, combined with its dynamic quanti cational mechanism, allows an easy switch between absolute and restricted quanti cation.
We will also present some arguments against an alternative approach to anaphoric de nite descriptions, which accounts for their anaphoric nature by coindexing them with a speci c term in the context. We will provide some examples which are intended to show that|at least in some cases|coindexing cannot do the job, whereas contextually restricted quanti cation can. As it seems to be the case that in those cases where coindexing does work, contextually restricted dynamic quanti cation can also be used, we venture the hypothesis that the latter is to be preferred as a general mechanism. 2 However, the empirical eld of de nites and anaphors is vast and treacherous. Here, we can only scratch the surface, and deal with a few, relatively simple examples. Further research is called for to take the hypothesis to the test.
Context and Information
Update semantics takes a radical stand on the context dependent nature of interpretation. The meaning of a sentence is identi ed with its context change potential. Contexts are taken to be information states. Hence, meanings are looked upon as update functions on information states. Thus, interpretation creates context. At the same time, the updates constituted by sentences are often partial functions: in order to produce output, they may put constraints on the input. In the dynamic process of interpretation, the making and the making use of the context go hand in hand.
Information states contain two kinds of information: information about the world, and discourse information. In the end, it is information about the world that counts, but in acquiring such information through discourse, one also has to store information pertaining to the discourse as such. For example, in order to be able to resolve anaphoric links across utterances, one has to keep track of the discourse items. At present, this is the only kind of discourse information we take into account.
Information states are de ned as sets of possibilities, where possibilities consist of a possible world, a referent system, and an assignment which links the discourse information represented in the referent system to information about the world.
The possible worlds which are present in an agent's information state should be looked upon as alternative ways the world could be as far as the partial information of the agent goes. As information about the world grows, some such alternatives will be eliminated. According to this picture, growth of information about the world amounts to elimination of possibilities.
2. We do not claim that all anaphoric terms can be treated in this way. In particular, in keeping with previous work, we will assume in what follows that (singular) anaphoric pronouns are treated by means of coindexing, i.e., as bound variables, where the dynamics of the binding mechanism allows for variables to be bound outside the syntactic scope of a quanti er.
In an initial information state no discourse has started yet. The possibilities in an initial state only consist of a possible world. The referent system, and hence the assignments, are still empty. They get lled as discourse goes on: discourse items are added to the referent system, and objects are assigned to them as possible referents. Final states are like initial states. Once a discourse is nished, discourse information is of no further use, and can be discarded. Similarly, parts of discourse|even certain parts of a single sentence|can create local discourse information which is erased after the interpretation of that part is completed.
For the purpose of illustration, information states can be depicted as simple matrices, as is shown in the gures below. Each row in the matrix corresponds to a possibility in the information state. The rst position in each row is reserved for the possible world in that possibility. 3 The other columns in the matrix concern discourse information, and are added one by one as the discourse goes on. They can also be deleted again, when the (relevant part of) the discourse is closed o . Each column corresponds to a particular discourse item, introduced by a term in the discourse. 4 The assignment function in each possibility lls the elds in the corresponding row. Each eld contains an object (from the domain of the world in that possibility), which is a possible value of the discourse item in question, given the way things are in the possible world in that possibility, and given the values of the other items in that possibility.
One and the same item may have alternative possible values with respect to one and the same world, and the particular values already assigned to earlier items. This means that one and the same world may gure in two or more di erent possibilities. 5 In the gures that follow it is illustrated how information extends as discourse proceeds: In going from one state to the next, new items may be 3. Pictures can be illuminating. But they can also easily mislead. Representing information states as simple matrices has its limitations. It suggests that information states are small, nite objects, whereas in fact they are usually in nite. It is also important to keep in mind that|unlike the boxes of Discourse Representation Theory|the matrices do not represent discourse, but depict the result of interpreting discourse. They are lled with model theoretic objects, represented in the metalanguage, not with expressions of the object language. 4. We do not take into consideration here that there is also the possibility that`discourse' items come to life by other means than explicit discourse. For example, the salient presence of an object in the visual eld shared by two or more agents may lead to the creation of a discourse item, too. Furthermore, it may happen that, although an item is not explicitly introduced by the discourse, it is implicitly`present' on the basis of what has been said. The latter may be thought to occur in case of the anaphoric use of the de nite the captain, after one has talked about a ship, without explicitly having mentioned its captain. See Dekker 1993 for an analysis of implicit arguments in a dynamic setting. 5. In other papers, we refer to discourse items as`pegs'. Apart from this terminological variation, what is left out of consideration here is that the referent system also keeps track of which variables of the logical language are in active use, and with which peg they are associated. The matrices also do not show that there is a di erence between rows and columns. Information states are sets of possibilities. Hence the order of the rows is irrelevant. The possibilities themselves, however, are ordered, in the sense that the order of the columns re ects the order in which the discourse items are introduced. I.e., the discourse items can be identi ed with their column number. (Indeed, pegs 
A Man
Suppose an agent has the following information: Either no man walks in the park, or only Alf does, or both Alf and Bill do, or all men in the domain of discourse|Alf, Bill and Chris|are strolling there. Furthermore, one has the information that only Bill is wearing blue suede shoes. 6 If these are the only relevant pieces of information, the information state of the agent can be depicted as in Figure 1a , a one-dimensional matrix just consisting of four possible worlds. (The subscripts are used as a mnemonic device, to indicate how many men are walking in the park.)
Now suppose the agent is told the following: (1) A man is walking in the park.
6. It is not that essential to the example, but the description of the information of the agent is to be taken in such a way that it is about objects, about the interpretations of expressions of the object language. E.g., the way we described the information, is to be understood in such a way that the agent may very well not know which of the three men is called Alf, which one is called Bill, or which one is called Chris. In our description of the information of the agent,`Alf',`Bill' and`Chris' function as expressions of the metalanguage to name these three objects. They are not the homophonous names of the language that the agent shares with other agents.
The initial information state depicted in Figure 1a is transformed into state 1c, where the intermediate state 1b exempli es the e ects of processing the inde nite term a man.
Inde nites involve existential quanti cation, one of the dynamic e ects of which is the introduction of a new discourse item in the information state, i.e., the addition of a new column to the matrix. With respect to each possibility in the initial state, there are three possible values to assign to the new eld, since there are three men in the domain of discourse. So, for each of the four possibilities in 1a, we obtain three extensions in the intermediate state 1b, one for each man in the domain of discourse.
Processing the remaining predicative part of the sentence results in the elimination of possibilities in which the man that is the value of the new eld, is not walking in the park in the world of that possibility. This means that in the resulting state 1c, world w 0 |the world in which no man walks in the park|gets out of the picture. And each of the other three possibilities in the initial state subsist in as many extensions as there are men walking in the park in the world of that possibility, with one of those men as a possible value of the newly introduced discourse item.
Context Sets
As is clear from the way they are depicted, information states naturally come with a contextually restricted domain of discourse. Not only is there in each possibility a global domain of discourse, consisting of all the objects that live in the world of that possibility; but furthermore there is the restricted set of the objects which in that possibility are the values of the discourse items. This set is called the context set of that possibility.
For example, in the states depicted in Figure 2 below, the context set consists in each possibility of a single individual. And in the states depicted in Figures 3b and 3c , the context set in each possibility consists of two objects.
Quanti cation restricted to context sets was rst introduced and studied in Westerst ahl Westerst ahl 1984. Westerst ahl stresses the point that a context set is to be distinguished from a universe of discourse. The former, unlike the latter, is not constant over pieces of discourses. Westerst ahl only considers \the formal framework for context sets, leaving (the more di cult) question of how context sets are chosen to more ambitious semantic theories".
In the present set-up, context sets are not subject to choice, but are constructed (and deconstructed) in a deterministic fashion through the interpretation procedures. In principle there is a choice to be made when one meets a term in the text: between absolute and contextually restricted quanti cation. But once one has opted for the latter, the relevant context sets are simply provided by the contents of the information state at that point, leaving no further choice.
The context sets do have the characteristic features of being relatively small and in constant ux, because they depend on the discourse items, which have a relatively short life span.
The fact that information states come with context sets can be used to interpret anaphoric terms as contextually restricted quanti ers. The general picture is as follows.
The update associated with an anaphoric term is characteristically partial and comes with a precondition, making a certain requirement on the actual contents of the context sets of the possibilities of the input state. Either the state has to already support the requirement, or|in case accommodation is permitted|it should be consistent with it, i.e., it should be possible to update the state in such a way that afterwards it meets the requirement.
If the state can not (be made to) meet the precondition, the interpretation procedure aborts. If it can, the process continues along the following lines. The referent system is extended with a new discourse item, and the possible values of the new item are determined relative to the objects in the context sets, in a way which depends on the quanti cational nature and the descriptive content of the term. Invariably, if it succeeds, the procedure as a whole will output a real extension of the input state.
The Man
As for anaphoric de nite description, they have as their precondition that within the context set of each possibility, i.e., among the values of the discourse items in that possibility, there is a unique object that satis es its descriptive content. If this condition can not be ful lled, the updating proces comes to a halt. If it can, the de nite description introduces a new discourse item, and in each possibility, the value of the new item is the unique object in the context set that satis es the content of the description. 7 Note that the uniqueness requirement is far from absolute. Not only is it not required that in the world there is a unique object that satis es the content of the description (as absolute quanti cation would require), even among all the possible values of the discourse items in the state as a whole, there may be many such objects, also with respect to a single possible world.
Following this recipe, updating the state depicted in Figure 2a|the result of updating the sample information state with sentence (1)|with sentence (2), will lead to the state 2c, via the intermediary state 2b, which is the result of processing the anaphoric de nite the man.
(2) The man is wearing blue suede shoes. The man that is being talked about has to be Bill, since according to the information of the agent, Bill is the only one wearing blue suede shoes. (But Bill is not the only man, nor the only man walking in the park.)
Notice the following. The de nite description itself introduces a new discourse item. In the present case, this may seem of little use, since the two discourse items are completely indistinguishable: In each possibility in the information state the two items have the same value. And from here on, they will behave as if they were one and the same. We will meet other cases, though, 7. Obviously, the procedure as it is described in the text needs further re nement. See the discussion in section 11. where the introduction of a new item by an (anaphoric) de nite description will turn out to be essential. 8 Notice also that in dealing with the example, no use is made of a coindexing mechanism. The anaphoric de nite description picks up its antecedent solely via its quanti cational force and its descriptive content. Again, in this particular case, one might just have well have used a coindexing mechanism, linking the de nite explicitly with a particular discourse item introduced earlier. However, as we will see shortly, in general the two procedures make a di erence.
Some Donkeys
Heim (Heim 1982 , p. 226{9) puts forward the following two examples as prima facie problems for a Russellian, i.e., for a quanti cational account of (anaphoric) de nite descriptions:
(3) If a man beats a donkey, the donkey kicks him (4) Every boy who likes his mother visits her for Christmas The di culty with (3) is how to make sense of the uniqueness that a quanticational approach would require. The problem with (4) is how the de nite his mother is to bind the pronoun her, which is outside its syntactic scope.
Given a dynamic approach to quanti cation, the second type of example can be dealt with straightforwardly by treating his mother as a dynamic quanti er, thus extending its binding force beyond its syntactic scope. Notice by the way that this quanti er is absolute here: for each possible value of the pronominal element which it contains, uniqueness is satis ed in the world, not just relative to a context set.
So, we concentrate on the rst type of example. Sentence (3) is a conditional. Processing a conditional involves comparing three states: the input state, the input state hypothetically updated with the antecedent, and the state that results from a further hypothetical update with the consequent.
The update of a conditional sentence as a whole is purely eliminative: the output state will be a subset of the input state. I.e., after having processed 8. If a state contains two indistinguishable items, this is a good reason for cleansing it by discarding one of the two. Doing so saves space and can make no di erence for whatever update is still to follow. the conditional as a whole, no new discourse items will have been added. New items may be introduced while the procedure is running, but at the end they will have been deleted again. The e ect of an update with a conditional is that a possibility is eliminated from the input state unless all its extensions in the state that results after updating with the antecedent, survive a further update with the consequent. 9 Suppose that an agent has the following information: Either no man beats donkeys, or both Alf and Chris beat Heehaw, and besides, maybe Alf beats Eeyore, too, maybe not. Fortunately, surely no more beating is going on. (Guys wearing blue suede shoes don't do things like that.) Concerning the donkeys, Heehaw is known to be of the kind that kicks back when beaten, about Eeyore information pertaining to his behaviour under such circumstances is lacking.
In case this is the only relevant information, the initial state of the agent reckons with four possible worlds. The state can be depicted as in Figure 3a. (The higher the subscript, the more violence is going on.)
In evaluating (3), we subsequently update this state with the antecedent a man beats a donkey and the consequent the donkey kicks him. The results are depicted in Figure 3b and 3c, respectively. Testing the initial state with respect 9. It is well known that here are cases of binding across conditionals. But at present, we stick to this oversimpli cation. to these two hypothetical states in the way described above, leads to the nal state 3d. World w 2 |the world in which Alf beats both donkeys, but in which Eeyore is not kicking back|is eliminated. Of the three extensions it had in the state after updating with the antecedent, only two survived a further update with the consequent. Hence, in the nal state, those possible worlds will have remained, in which for every man and every donkey such that the man beats the donkey, that donkey kicks that man.
So, using contextually restricted quanti cation, we meet no problem in interpreting the anaphoric de nite description as a quanti er. And note that the kind of uniqueness it requires does not preclude that a man beats more than one donkey. Such possibilities simple survive, provided the vilain is kicked back by every poor beast. 10 This means that sentence (3), at least when taken as an initial piece of discourse, is equivalent with:
(6) If a man beats a donkey, it kicks him. Whether or not (5) is fully equivalent with (3), independent of where in the discourse it occurs, is a question which is not easy to answer. 11 10. So, for better or worse, the proposed analysis does not predict strong uniqueness e ects. However, what is predicted is that if non-uniqueness is explicitly communicated, there is a di erence. Consider:
(5) Alf is a farmer. He owns a donkey. He owns another donkey. Every farmer who owns a donkey, beats the donkey that he owns. According to the present analysis, no information state will accept this sequence. The indefinites in the second and third sentences will introduce two donkey-items in the information state, such that in every possibility two di erent donkeys are assigned to these items. But this means that by the time we meet the anaphoric de nite description the donkey that he owns, the precondition that there is exactly one donkey among the values of the discourse items is not ful lled in each possibility. (And neither can it be accommodated.) So, what is predicted is that informants will have no problems in accepting sentence (3), in case they consider it possible that some men beat more than one donkey, i.e., if uniqueness is not part of the information about the world. However, in case the non-uniqueness has been turned into discourse information, having created possibilities with more than one donkey among the values of the discourse items, informants will judge the sentence to be incorrect in that context. This is what the analysis predicts. However, for obvious reasons, it seems a prediction that is rather di cult to test by eliciting judgments from informants. 11. From a technical point of view, there are two basic mechanisms available to deal with anaphoric relations within update semantics. The one is coindexing, the other is contextually restricted dynamic quanti cation, which is what we are discussing here. (Combinations of the two, are also possible. The term his mother in example (4) may provide a case in point.) As far as pronouns are concerned, it is not obvious to us which of the two techniques is to be preferred. If we treat pronouns as quanti ers rather than variables, (3) and (5) can be made fully equivalent. The question that arises is whether they are indeed equivalent. For example, if we replace the de nite the donkey that he owns by it in the discourse in the previous note, does that make a di erence, or not? Likewise, is there a di erence in acceptability (the potential to be accommodated) between the following sequences?
(7) A doctor came in. Another doctor came in. The man said to the woman: : : (8) A doctor came in. Another doctor came in. He said to her: : : If (15) is judged to be better than (16), this judgment could be used as evidence in favour of treating pronouns by means of coindexing. If one feels little or no di erence, that might be evidence in favour of a quanti cational approach.
Another Man
Not only de nite descriptions can be anaphoric, virtually any quanti er can be used in an anaphoric way. The inde nite determiner another is a clear case of a quanti er that can only be interpreted by relating it to context sets. Consider:
(9) A man is walking in the park. Another man is walking in the park, too. Contextual dependence comes in at several points. First of all, there is the precondition that in every possibility there should be at least one man in the context set of that possibility. If not, the interpretation process comes to a halt. If this precondition is met, the state is extended with a new discourse item, the value of which in a possibility is to be a man from the global domain of discourse, which is not yet a member of the context set of that possibility. How many extensions result in the new state for each old possibility depends on how many such men there are.
Hence, in our sample state|as it was speci ed in section 3|,which after an update with the rst sentence of (6) results in the state depicted in Figure 4a , a further update with the second sentence of (6) leads via 4b, presenting the e ect of processing the anaphoric inde nite another man, to 4c. Note that world w 1 |in which only one man walks in the park|has been eliminated. (Just as w 2 would be eliminated if we repeat the last sentence of (6) once more.)
Note that in this case, too, no coindexing is used to account for the anaphoric link. In fact it is hard to imagine how one could call upon coindexing as a way to account for this kind of anaphoric relation. (Coindexing seems particularly unsuited to deal with iterated uses of another: : : (yet) another: : : .)
The two discourse items that are present in the information state obtained after processing (6) have a special feature. They are quantitatively distinct: In each possibility they have a di erent value. But they are qualitatively indistinguishable: For each possibility in which the two items have a particular value, there is another possibility which is the same, except for the fact that the values of the two items are interchanged. 12 The fact that the items introduced in (6) by the inde nite terms a man and another man are quantitatively di erent, but qualitatitively equal, explains why one cannot refer back to a particular one of the two men involved using a singular anaphoric de nite description. 13 12. Continuing on the remark made in note 8, here one meets another reason for cleansing information states. Since after processing (6), the two discourse items are qualitatively indistinguishable, there is little use in keeping these two separate items. It would do just as well to have a single item instead, the value of which in each possibility is the set consisting of the two men in question. This would halve the number of possibilities in state 4c, since the order in which the two have been introduced is irrelevant. Apart from being more economic, the e ect of such a cleansing operation would make no di erence. We abstain from actually performing such cleansing operations, since the formal system on the background is not yet attuned to plural reference. 13. Notice the di erence between (6) and (17).
(10) A man entered the room. Another man entered the room. Unlike (6), it is most natural to interpret (17) as a description of two subsequent events. In that case, as participants in two di erent events, the two men are qualitatively di erent, which does make it possible to anaphorically refer back to just one of them using a description such as the man who entered rst or, simply the rst and the second. 8 The One and the Other Of course, it is possible to continue (6) and by anaphoric means refer to each of the two men separately. However, such anaphoric reference is to neither of the two men in particular. One way to do so is as follows: 14 (12) The one is wearing blue suede shoes, the other is not. We treat the one: : : the other: : : as a polyadic quanti er. Its precondition is that the context set of each possibility consists of two di erent objects which satisfy the descriptive content of the quanti er, which in this particular case is empty. I.e., the precondition makes use of the only aspect that distinguishes between the two men: that they are quantitatively distinct.
If the precondition is met, two new discourse items are added, and for each old possibility, we end up with two new ones: one extension in which in the eld of the two new items we nd the values of the two old items in the same order, and one in which we nd them in the two new elds in the reverse order. (See Figure 4d. ) Note that it is impossible to coindex one of the elements of the polyadic de nite with one of the two preceding inde nites speci cally. In the particular case of (6) followed by (7), this may seem of little importance, precisely because the two items introduced by (6) are quantitatively indistinguishable. However that in general the procedure has to be as it was described above, is obvious from the simpler example:
(13) Alfred is walking in the park. Bill is walking in the park, too. The one is wearing a hat, the other is not. In interpreting the last sentence one can not associate one of the items introduced by the polyadic de nite with either the item introduced by the name Alfred, or the one associated with the name Bill. Unless, that is, we know which of the two actually is wearing a hat. But the lack of this information does not prevent one from being able to process this sequence of sentences. However, if we had to coindex each of the elements of the polyadic quanti er with one particular item in the context, the uninterpretability of this sequence would in Another case in point is:
(11) Look! A man is walking in the park. Look! Another man is walking in the park, too. Both men are apparently located in the visual eld of the speech participants, and hence are distinguishable. That is why here, too, a de nite description can be used to refer to a particular one of these two men. For example, one could continue (18) with The rst one is my brother. Such a continuation would be out in case of (6), under the assumption that there is no additional information, visual or otherwise, from outside the discourse that qualitatively distinguishes between the two men. In case of (18) the inde nites are used referentially: for each of the discourse items introduced by them, its value is the same in each possibility, since |by assumption|the object is observationally present. (See Groenendijk et al. 1995b; Ludlow and Neale 1991.) 14. According to certain stylistic rules for English the the one: : : the other construction is bad, and the one: : : and the other constructions is to be preferred. (In Dutch, by the way, the preference is precisely the other way around.) Unlike the former construction, the latter need not be analyzed as a polyadic quanti er. One can interpret one as contextually restricted existential quanti cation, and the other as the x such that x 6 = y, where y is to be the variable introduced by one. So, in the analysis of the other one has to use both contextually restricted quanti cation, and coindexing in accounting for its anaphoric impact. fact ensue.
As a nal example of this particular sort, consider yet another familiar donkey:
(14) If a bishop meets another bishop, the one blesses the other Given the update procedures as they were sketched above, this sentence takes care of itself.
Comparing Numbers
Consider the following sequence of sentences:
(15) A man is walking in the park. Another man is walking in the park, too. The man is wearing blue suede shoes. Obviously, the continuation with the last sentence is infelicitous. Under the analysis proposed here, this is easily accounted for: The uniqueness precondition of the de nite is not ful lled (nor can it be accommodated).
An analysis of anaphoric de nite descriptions in terms of coindexing with a preceding term also has to impose a precondition on coindexing to be able to account for the infelicity of (10). If coindexing were free, as seems to be the case in the quanti cational approach in van Eijck 1993, nothing would prevent an anaphoric link with just one of the preceding inde nites, rendering (10) ambiguous rather than out. Such problems seem inevitable for any account of anaphoric relations that freely coindexes an anaphor with a particular term as its antecedent. 15 Heim's analysis (see Heim 1982) of anaphoric de nites avoids this problem, by formulating a precondition on coindexing. Casted in our terminology (and leaving salience out of the picture), it requires that there is a unique discourse item in the referent system of the information state that satis es the content of the description (or can be made to do so after accommodation).
Clearly, in case Heim's precondition on the felicitous use of an anaphoric de nite description is met, so is ours. But not the other way around. We require there to be a unique object in the context set, i.e., among the values of all discourse items in each possibility. The objects one nds in di erent possibilities, may be the values of di erent items. This freedom is not allowed for in Heim's non-quanti cational coindexing approach, which can only link an anaphoric de nite description with one particular preceding term.
Above, we already met examples of (polyadic) anaphoric de nite descriptions for which it is impossible to make such links with speci c earlier introduced discourse items. The following example shares this feature, but it concerns simple, non-polyadic, anaphoric de nite descriptions.
(16) Eva wrote down a number. She wrote down another number. : : : She wrote down another number. She subtracted the smallest number from the largest one.
Interpreting the terms the smallest number and the largest number does not require that we be able to identify particular discourse items as satisfying their descriptive contents. The term the largest number has as its precondition that in each possibility there is among the objects in the context set of that possibility a number which is greater than all other numbers in the context set. Analogously for the smallest. (So, both the de nite article as such, and the interpretation of largest and smallest involve contextually restricted quanti cation.) For the example in question, this precondition is easily met. But, surely, the largest number we nd in the one possibility can be the value of one particular item (can be in the eld in one particular column), whereas the largest number we nd in another possibility can be the value of another item (can be in the eld of another column). It is precisely this feature that prevents an analysis in terms of coindexing an anaphoric de nite description with a particular preceding inde nite.
A Heimian analysis, which amounts to imposing this requirement as a precondition on coindexing an anaphoric de nite with a particular preceding inde nite, is hence not able to account for this type of example just like that.
The Tallest Man
A similar example, which can be treated in the same way, involves real men instead of mere numbers:
(17) A man is walking in the park. Another man is walking in the park, too. The tallest man is wearing a hat. It di ers from the previous case, in that this example involves accommodation: unlike the relation larger than on the domain of numbers, the relation taller than on the domain of men is not connected. Accommodation involves the elimination of those possibilities in which the two men in the context set are equally tall.
Suppose that on top of the information the agent had at the beginning of section 3, he furthermore knows that Alf and Bill are equally tall, and that both are taller than Chris. Besides that, he knows that either Alf or Bill is wearing a hat, but not Chris. So, instead of the four worlds depicted in Figure 1a , the initial state of the agent now has to reckon with eight possibilities. Instead of world w n , we get two worlds w na and w nb , where n reminds us of the number of men walking in the park, and the a or b indicate whether Alf or Bill is wearing a hat. Figure 5 gives the relevant steps of updating the agents information state with (12). The precondition of the tallest man requires that the context set of a possibility contains a man which is taller than the other men in that context set. Accommodating the precondition, no possibility from state 5a in wich the context set consists of Alf and Bill survives in 5b, since Alf and Bill are equally tall. This means that w 2a and w 2b are altogether eliminated, since there only Alf and Bill walk in the park. And possibilities containing w 3a or w 3b only survive if Chris is in the context set. w 2a
Although we may have to reckon with the possibility that the man relates to the doctor, by far the most likely interpretation of (13) is that the man is anaphorically linked to a man. The current treatment does not account for this.
Without accommodation, the sentence would be declared out, since there will be possibilities in which the context set contains two men. Allowing for accommodation, the result is that all possibilities in which the doctor is male are eliminated. For in order to arrive at a unique man in each possibility, as the precondition for anaphoric de nite decriptions requires, we would have to infer from the second sentence that the doctor is a woman. Both options certainly are not in accordance with intuitions. Do examples like (13) then show that the proposed analysis is untenable? We do not think so. But what they do show is that the analysis is in need of further re nement. Information states need to be extended with more structured and detailed representations of discourse information.
In principle there are two ways to assure that the uniqueness condition works in cases such as these. One is to allow only part of the context set to be taken into consideration. The other option is to add further features to the items as such, and to make the uniqueness requirement sensitive to these features. The overall e ect will be the same in both cases: it becomes easier to ful ll the uniqueness requirement.
Probably, both strategies are called for. As for the rst option, it does seem likely that merely having a list of discourse items is not su cient. Discourse itself is not just a list of phrases, but has a much more intricate structure. More of this structure should be re ected in the way in which its discourse items are ordered. Consequently, the referent system may consist of di erent layers of discourse items. One could look upon this as an implementation of part of the notorious notion of salience, discourse items in a higher layer being more salient than ones lower down. Then, the uniqueness precondition need not search through the set of all items, but may be restricted to the items available up to a certain level.
However, it does not seem very likely that the strategy just outlined would work for the type of example (13). It is far from clear that after having processed the rst sentence the man is more salient than the doctor. Rather, what seems to be important in this case is that the descriptive contents of the de nite the man and the inde nite a man are much more alike than those of the doctor and the man: the item corresponding to a man is more salient as an object tting that description, i.e., as a man, than the item corresponding to the doctor.
This brings us to the second strategy distinguished above: adding more features of discourse information to the items as such. As things stand, discourse information is not sensitive to the descriptive content by means of which the items are introduced. If this kind of discourse information would be added, the uniqueness precondition could be made sensitive to it, and give the right outcome for cases like (13).
One could then formulate the search procedure in such a way that items that do not t the contents of the description as well as others may be ignored. The measure of t can be determined from the values of the items in the in-formation state as a whole. For example, in case of (13) one will probably nd women among the possible values of the item introduced by the doctor. And even if all the doctors are men (according to the information of the agent), the item introduced by a man would still show a better match, as long as not all men are doctors.
Of course, the details need to be spelled out, but it seems not unlikely that if discourse information is re ned along these lines, examples such as (13) need not obstruct the kind of quanti cational approach proposed here.
A nal remark: the strategies outlined above do not necessarily result in deterministic procedures: sometimes equally good solutions for the resolution of an anaphor might result. But then, that seems true to life: even in case of (13) the man may turn out to be the doctor, and not the man.
Conclusion
Apart from the empirical di erences noted above, Heim's approach and the one proposed in this paper also di er in ontology.
Heim|following Karttunen in this|is a representative of the more general theoretical move to dissociate coreference from reference to the same real object, and to introduce formal objects{discourse referents, le cards, discourse items, pegs|and take coreference to consist in being related to the same such formal object.
The analysis of coreference proposed here, brings coreference back to real reference to objects, within contextually restricted domains. The formal objects, discourse items, still have a role to play, though: their possible values, which are real objects, determine the context sets that quanti cation can be restricted to.
We hope to have adduced some evidence that the move back from formal coreference (coindexing, really) to real coreference may pay its way, by providing a more adequate and uniform account, not only of anaphoric denite descriptions, but also of other anaphoric elements. However, whether this uniform approach can be maintained throughout remains to be seen.
